THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE HOOK NOVEMBER 18th/19th 1952
BACKGROUND
On the 14th April 1952 as a result of adjustments under "Operation Westminster" the Commonwealth Division was deployed as follows:
Left Boundary - River Samichon, with the 1st US Marine Division to the west of the river.
Right Boundary - including points 355 and 238 with 45th US Infantry Division on the Eastern flank.
The advanced party of 1st BW had arrived in the divisional area on the 8th June. By 22nd June the battalion, under the command of Lt/Col. David McNeil Campbell Rose, had completed its concentration and it was arranged that training should be completed by 7th July, after which the Black Watch would join the 29th British Infantry Brigade.
Under plan "Sovereign" the Commonwealth Division received orders on 23rd October to take over the sector of the right battalion of the 1st US Marine Division west of the Samichon River. This left sector was to become the responsibility of 29th IB. To the extreme right, 2000 yards of its line between the Imjin and Kowang-san, was handed over to 1st ROK Division. This right sector became the responsibility of 28th Brigade (Commonwealth Infantry) with the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade moving into Reserve.
The Brigades were formed as follows:
25th Canadian IB (Brig. M.P. Bogert)
1st Btn The Royal Canadian Reg. (Lt.Col. P.R. Bingham)
1st Btn Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (Lt.Col. J.R.Cameron)
1st Btn Royal 22nd Regiment (Lt.Col. L. F. Trudeau)
28th Commonwealth Infant Brigade (Brig. TJ Daly)
1st Btn The Royal Fusiliers (Lt./Col G R Stevens)
1st Btn The Durham LI (Lt/Col P. J. Jeffreys)
1st Btn Royal Australian Regt. (Lt./Col. I Hutchison)
3rd Btn Royal Australian Regt. (Lt.Col. R L Hughes)
29th British Infantry Brigade (Brig. A H G Ricketts)
1st Btn The Kings Regt. (Liverpool) (Lt/Col A J Snodgrass)
1st Btn The Duke of Wellingtons Regt. (Lt/Col FR St P. Bunbury)
1st Btn The BW (Lt/Col Rose)
The Sector on the left included the vital "Hook" position which was to become the scene of much bitter fighting in the ensuing months.
PRELIMINARY INFORMATION AND INDICATIONS
The first enemy attack on the Hook was on the night October 26th/27th and was repelled by units of the 7th US Marines reinforced by 1st US Marines.
Brigadier Ricketts, 29th IB C/O, ordered 1st BW to occupy the Hook position by first light on November 4th. Actual command was passed over to Col. Rose at 2338 on the 3rd November when the battalion relieved the 1st Btn and an element of the 3rd Btn of the 7th US Marines.
Although an American Marine or Army Btn had only three rifle companies each numbered over 200. Due to manpower shortages the strength of a British Commonwealth Rifle Company was about 100. However, 1BW had 884 all ranks against an establishment of 869. Each of its rifle companies had five officers and at least 130 OR's.
Because of the size and importance of the position a fifth Rifle Company, a company of 2R 22nd was placed under Col Rose's command. The US Marines continued to be the divisions and hence the battalion's neighbour to the west.
Upon inspection of the position on the cold morning of November 4th (temperatures were falling to 25 degrees Fahrenheit by night) it was obvious that two things needed to be done.
1) Re-establishing covered firing positions destroyed by the recent fighting.
2) Making ready for the occupation of night outposts.
The Chinese knew that the Black Watch had taken over the position - a propaganda broadcast stated "We know the Black Watch have taken over from the Americans but it won't make any difference". They took a particular interest in the two major standing patrol positions, Ronson and Warsaw, covering the run in to the Hook.
In addition BW patrols investigating their new areas found that the Warsaw sector had been used as a shield by the enemy for the construction of some 50 caves. These had been used for the first attack against the US Marines. They were demolished by the Engineers.
A fortnight before the main attack on 18/19 November the Hook positions were repeatedly shelled and mortared and sniped by small arms fire. During the two days prior to the attack artillery and mortar fire increased considerably in the area of "A" and "C" companies 1BW. The most significant factor being the use by the enemy of Self Propelled guns from close in positions. During the day of 18th Nov at least 300 rounds were received in the area.
Finally and disturbingly the intercept detachment picked up the following enemy message at 1930 hours 18th November.
"Listen, make thorough and accurate check up while manoeuvred to Canchu Shien" This apparently meant the Blue Line Column which was used to refer to an area on the Hook last September.
Unfortunately, the intercept was not passed on to the 1st BW and this has never been adequately explained.
THE BATTLE
LAST LIGHT TO 2100hrs
As usual it was intended to establish routine patrols during the night so as to cover the area. The patrol on Ronson did take up its position but the patrol to Warsaw was delayed by shellfire, which subsequently died down, and the patrol moved out.
The combined "D" Company ambush patrol commanded by Sgt W. E. Kerry (19033346), who was to win the MM for his actions, and "B" Company Recce patrol commanded by 2/Lt Doig, left "A" Company area through the Warsaw gate in the wire and proceeded along the ridge towards Warsaw.
Sgt Kerry's patrol was going to set up an ambush and 2/Lt Doig was to proceed from there with his patrol to obtain information about previously reported enemy activity in the valley below.
The party was led by Sgt. Kerry, followed by 2/Lt Doig and his two men, with the remainder of Sgt Kerry's patrol behind. Altogether there were fourteen men. They were moving very quietly along the ridge and had reached the bottom of the last rise of this ridge before arriving at the position of Warsaw itself.
It was here (approx. 105106) that 2/Lt Doig and Sgt. Kerry heard movement in front of them and got down. This was around 1905. The two men decided to wait a little to see what would happen though neither could see anything despite the fact that the noise was increasing. So it was in this position that the two patrols were halted strung out in single file along the path.
Suddenly 2/Lt Doig got up and shouted "Charge!" and ran forward firing his weapon together with Sgt. Kerry. There were flashes from the enemy on the ridge above them; presumably this was the report of hearing a "burp" gun and SA fire from the area of the patrol recorded at 1909.
When they had gone only a few yards a grenade landed in front of Sgt. Kerry and another between him and 2/Lt Doig. Meanwhile, the rest of the patrol, spread out as they were in a line behind, had hardly had time to react before they were blinded by these grenades.
The patrol stayed where it was and returned fire with their rifles and LMG's. There was a belt of wire separating them from the enemy. Groans were heard from the enemy's direction but fortunately Sgt. Kerry although having been knocked off his feet now returned and gave orders for the two Bren Gunners to cover each flank.
L/Cpl Findlay was then ordered by Sgt. Kerry to fall back with a party of men, which included Pte O'Rourke who had been wounded, to the next knoll behind them on the ridge, so as to cover his withdrawal.
Once there Sgt. Kerry along with Ptes Gill and Glass went forward again so as to make a sweep of the area but then found nothing. Sgt. Kerry then took the decision to move back along the ridge to within 150 yards of Warsaw Gate where the men took up an ambush position.
As the wireless was not working Ptes Gill and McGregor were sent back with the wounded Pte O'Rourke to report to "A" Company (a report was received in the Btn CP at 2055 hours).
L/Cpl Mackay and three men all of "D" Company came out to reinforce the patrol. Sgt. Kerry then put L/Cpl Mackay in front of the patrol and proceeded to go from man to man making a check on the ammo etc. He was checking the fourth man when a heavy enemy barrage came down on and around them, which lasted for some time.
2100 - 2300 HOURS
At 2102 hours came the first report that "A" Company was being attacked. Major A. D. H. Irwin C/O "A" Company reported that he was being attacked in company strength from three directions with a platoon constituting each force.
The enemy came in from Ronson, Warsaw and from the gully (103104). The enemy came in his barrage and, it was reported, actually in front of it. Sgt. Kerry's group remember was out in front of Warsaw Gate and it is to their situation that we now return.
Sgt. Kerry thought that he heard the sound
of a Chinese bugle when quite a number of Chinese (always referred to as China-men in the reports) came rushing up the ridge towards them but were halted by the wire. A fierce grenade battle then followed. The Chinese appeared again in waves each signalled by four blasts on the Bugle.
By this time the patrol was short of ammunition and eventually when it ran out Sgt. Kerry took the patrol down a steep re-entrant running down from the ridge. Eventually Sgt. Kerry returned through "D" Company at 0005 hours.
2/Lt Younger's Ronson patrol of six men had been in position since last light and they too were to be in the path of the Chinese as they launched their assault on "A" Company area. The barrage came down about 2025 sending earth into the trench that they occupied.
The wireless set would not work so 2/Lt Younger could not get in touch with Company Command. He had realised that the enemy was about to launch an attack and therefore decided that the Patrol would be of more use in the Company position.
The patrol had moved twenty or thirty yards back down the trench when it head burp guns from the direction of Ronson just over the hill from where they were. 2/Lt Younger decided to stop with the Bren Gunner to delay the enemy and thus giving the patrol a lead before joining them again. However, this was the last that he saw of them.
Then two Chinese came around the corner of the trench from Ronson and either the Bren Gunner Pte Evans, or a shell, killed them. 2/Lt Younger was struggling to get his sten gun free of earth but before he could do this two more of the enemy approached. Unfortunately the Bren Gun was not working either and the Chinese opened fire hitting both Pte Evans and 2/Lt Younger. As he was defenceless Younger shammed dead.
Eventually after meeting two more of the enemy who shot at him from five to ten yards 2/LT Younger made it back to the 2 platoon Command Post where he met Sgt. Gait. He was then taken to the Regimental Aid Post. The Ronson Patrol was in this way quickly overrun although survivors did come in later.
At 2103 the first defensive fire plans had been fired and immediately afterwards the tanks on pt 121 (103095) illuminated the area with searchlights and opened fire on the Ronson area. DF's were fired again at 2109 and meanwhile enemy shelling and mortar fire continued with at least one mortar firing from Warsaw. Shortly after 2110 VT (Variable Time i.e. air burst) was fired over the Ronson area. From this time an artillery support from the Divisional Artillery and from the 1st US Marine Division artillery was continuous.
Having swamped the two patrols "A" Company now took the full force of the Chinese attack. From 2110-2140 No 1 Platoon under 419717 2/Lt MDG Black, who was to win the MC, at the western end of the Hook was heavily engaged. There was then a lull until 2150 when it was again subjected to heavy shelling along with the whole of "A" Company and "D" Company to the east.
No. 1 Platoon retired to the tunnels which had been prepared on the Hook and VT was fired into the position and this continued until 2215. Cpl Wilson of 1 Platoon "A" Company described the situation thus:
"When the heavy bombardment started we made for our tunnels as ordered by 2/Lt Black. This barrage was exceptionally heavy and only the following members of my section reached the tunnel: -Ptes Millar 11, Dow 34, Stanley and Murphy. There were also two re personnel and 2 KSC parties in the tunnel."
"L/Cpl Watson, Ptes Swan and Oram of my section did not make the tunnel. Neither did Pte Dellow and Coley who were manning the Browning which fired out to Ronson".
"I was the last man to get into the tunnel and standing at the entrance saw the China Men come over the ridge in their own barrage. They fired a burp gun into the tunnel but it only hit the corner of it. I then went to the corner and fired a sten gun magazine out at them"
"Pte Millar then threw a grenade but it hit the wall and bounced back landing only six feet from me. On exploding a piece went into my knee. None of us now had anything left to fight with. I therefore let out a lot of groans and the chinamen came in".
The tunnel had been occupied one hour before the Chinese entered the tunnel and they did not know that it was occupied until Cpl Wilson fired his sten gun. The Chinese took all the men out of the tunnel where they searched them in a trench owing to the heavy shelling. After some time Ptes Millar, Dow, Murphy, Stanley and the two engineers were led off. Cpl Wilson was carried thirty/forty yards to a "Hutchie" (sic) or "Hootchie" which had ten Chinese in it, where he remained whilst the shelling was heaviest. Later in the trench he watched throughout the night as the Chinese pulled out their dead and wounded. Eventually one Chinaman came along and shook his hand and said "good luck"
The growing fire response and the fact that "A" Company. held firm, despite all that was thrown at it and that some of its entrenchments were lost, checked the Chinese momentum.
At 2207 "B" Company was ordered to stand by to be relieved by "B" Company of 3PPCLI. The plan was to move them up to "D" Company Administrative Area in order to reinforce "A" Company.
Ten minutes later artillery fire was lifted from the Hook and a DF barrage placed around the West and North approaches to it so as to stop the next wave of attack. No 1 Platoon was able to emerge from its tunnels and it w as reported that the area was clear. During this short break in the action OC "A" Company sent for the remains of 2 platoon under Sgt Gait to reinforce 1 platoon on the Hook.
The Pipes and Drums who had been in the position for some days fighting as a rifle platoon were withdrawn from their position (102023) and were put under the command of 3 Platoon
(2/LT Rattray). They were moved up the hill to take over the right flank of the Company position since these had been vacated by 2 Platoon on moving forward to the Hook. Thus the composite platoon was guarding the high ground and the run in to the position from Warsaw.
2300 - 0300 HOURS
Black Watch Platoon Movements
At 2312 the shelling increased and O/C "A" Company reported that it was impossible to search the area. However, as the Chinese Infantry were not very active at this time and mopping up continued until at ten minutes past midnight the area was reported clear with the exception of a small party of enemy at the western end of the Hook holding out in very badly damaged trenches.
Defensive fire was again put down onto enemy forming up positions and on their run in routes to the Hook. Immediately afterwards another attack came in from the west which overran the trenches although No 1 and No 2 Platoons remained in position and continued the action at close quarters.
At 0045 4 Platoons of "B" Company C/O 2/Lt Smart arrived in "A" company area closely followed by 10 Platoon of "D" company (Lt Haws) and a counter-attack was planned. Initially this was to be carried out by a platoon supported by a tank which was to motor up to its normal firing revetment on the Hook.
The plan was for 4 platoon to attack from SE to NW passing behind the tank and then swinging west along the Hook feature. Prior to the counter attack 4 platoon was put into the trench in front of "A" Company Command Post with 10 Platoon occupying the high ground formerly occupied by 2/3 Platoons so that they could bring fire to bear on the Hook when the attack went in. The matter of the tank was contentious. Col. Rose's intention was to make the men feel supported. However, tanks are particularly vulnerable at night.
The Centurion approached the top of the feature and 2 minutes VT was placed to keep the enemy's heads down. However, the tank was almost immediately hit by a bazooka in the driver's compartment setting the tank on fire. The driver was wounded but the C/O Lt M J C Anstice and the remaining crew returned to the night tank area.
At 0147 there was two more minutes of VT before No 4 Platoon went forward and made about fifty yards before being help up by LMG fire from the daylight Artillery Observation Post position which the enemy was holding as a strong point. The plan was now altered.
Officer Commanding "A" Company ordered 4 Platoon to give covering fire to 3 Platoon (Pipes and Drums under command) who had been ordered to the Start Line. 10 Platoon took their position and were to give 3 Platoon covering fire as it went forward at 0213 passing through 4 Platoon and clearing to the west. 3 Platoon succeeded in reaching the lateral trench running behind and to the east of the daylight artillery observation post where they were held up by light machine guns and grenades from the enemy established on the highest part of the Hook.
The position at 0255 was: -
The remainder of No. 1 and 2 Platoons were holding fast at the extreme west of the Hook feature; the enemy held the artillery observation post pimple and immediately to the east; no 3 Platoon held the lateral trench. The remainder of "A" company area was held by No.10 Platoon "D" Company.
0300 - 0800 HOURS
From this time on the character of the action changed with small parties of enemy Chinese being encountered all round the "A" Company area at various times and between "A" and "D" companies in the area 106101. This made for hard and confused fighting but the Black Watch held firm as Col. Rose continued to reinforce "A" Company with elements of "B" and "D" companies, the Assault Pioneers and Medium Machine Gunners. In addition Major C M Moir C/O "D" Company joined Major Irwin to take command of the various platoons counter attacking from the "A" Company area.
At 0307 2nd Lt Gray's No. 6 Platoon of "B" Company was still with "D" Company in the company administrative area when it was ordered to proceed to the hook by the shortest route. The situation in "D" company position now was that 11 Platoon held the left position; Assault Pioneer Platoon the centre with the right vacant. Accordingly the medium machineguns was to go forward as a rifle platoon to occupy it.
At 0345 a group of enemy engaged the Hook from the north-east and ten minutes later O/C no 1 Platoon of "A" company reported that the remainder of "A" Company which was now all on the Hook was being attacked from all sides. Defensive fire was again shot but at 0415 Major Irwin C.O. "A" Company reported that he was still being attacked. Col. Rose told him to hold on.
At 0425 12 Platoon on its way to the Hook to assist encountered twenty enemy on the ridge between it and 11 Platoon position of "D" Company. The Platoon commander 2/Lt Walker and half the Platoon reached the Hook. Sgt Robertson with eleven men remained in 11 Platoon position. He was ordered to mop up the enemy and get through to "A" Company Administrative Area.
Gradually the troops on the Hook were clearing the area so that by 0536 the position appeared to be cleared although the tunnels had not been checked. There were a few enemy still on the slopes forward of "A" Company Command Post. No 6 Platoon of "B" Company was ordered forward to deal with them. It was at this time (0552) that the OC "B" Company Major Rowan-Hamilton and OC No 6 Platoon 2/Lt Gray were both wounded by British Grenades thrown by the enemy.
At 6 o'clock on 19th November Major Irwin reported the situation confused with small parties of the enemy all around. He reported further that all of the reserves had been used up. Col. Rose's response was that the CO of "A" Company had to "stick it out".
The situation for the Battalion at this time was: -
"C" Company in normal positions
"A" Company composite force of all three platoons on the Western End of the Hook
"B" Company all platoons committed to the counter-attack roles in "A" Company area.
"D" Company left forward platoon in position, centre and right platoons committed to counter attacks in "A" Company area.
Assault Pioneer Platoon holding centre position of "D" Company area.
Col. Rose was now confident that the enemy potential was waning. He continued to search out possible hiding places on the forward slopes of his line while calling for "C" Company of 3 PCCLI, which was eventually to relieve "A" Company Black Watch on the Hook at 0820. Remember that "B" Company of 3PCCLI had relieved "B" Company Black Watch when the latter was moved to reinforce "A" Company Black Watch.
By 0630 the Hook was clear and at 0710 Col. Rose went forward. The Battle was over and by 0933 all wounded were off the Hook.
It was estimated that the enemy had attacked in Battalion strength. More than one hundred of his dead were actually counted but some were removed as the Chinese withdrew. The Battalion had lost 107 all ranks. 16 were killed or mortally wounded and 76 were wounded with 15 missing.
1st Black Watch had triumphed because it fought to the finish. The Battalion was largely made up of National Servicemen who maintained the long tradition of the regiment.
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