THE PART PLAYED BY THE 2nd BLACK WATCH IN THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN DECEMBER 11TH 1899


INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Magersfontein fought on December 11th 1899 was the biggest set back that the Black Watch had suffered since assaulting Fort Ticonderoga in 1758. For comparative purposes casualty figures in its major actions prior to the Boer War are given below.

ACTION YEAR KILLED WOUNDED
FONTENOY 1745 32 91
TICONDEROGA 1758 314 333
ABOUKIR 1801 31 159
ALEXANDRIA 1801 54 261
CORUNNA 1809 40 172
BURGOS 1812 36 169
TOULOUSE 1814 84 349
QUATRE BRAS 1815 45 243
TEL-EL-KABIR 1882 9 43
TAMAI 1884 60 29
MAGERSFONTEIN 1899 93 210


The disaster was made even worse by the death of one of the Regiment's most illustrious officers, Major General Andrew Wauchope, who was in command of the whole Highland Brigade. Combined with the casualties in the other Highland Regiments the impact in Scotland was devastating and produced a reaction of profound shock.

Reverses are hardly ever recorded in a Regiment's Battle Honours. Indeed, for the Boer War, Paardeberg is recorded as such for the 42nd. This account is written in honour of those Black Watch who were there, and to act as a record of their bravery and commitment to the Regiment on one of its blackest days.

MOBILISATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OCTOBER 1899



The mobilisation order for the 1st Army corps, of which the 2nd Black Watch was a part, reached Aldershot on 7th Oct. The Black Watch was quartered in Stanhope Lines as part of the 1st Brigade. 430 1st class army reservists reported from Perth and were piped into South camp, bringing the Battalion up to a total strength of 1011, of which 27 were officers. All of the reservists had previously served with the regiment.

The 2nd Black Watch was to be a part of the Highland Brigade, a part of the Second Division under Sir C F Clery, along with 1st Btn Highland Light Infantry (Devonport), 2nd Seaforths (Fort George), and 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Dublin).

The Brigade Commander was Major-General Andrew Wauchope. Major Ewart was Brigade Major, Captain Rennie the A-D-C and Lt A G Wauchope the galloper.

THE OFFICERS OF THE 2ND BLACK WATCH



O/C Lt/Colonel Coode
2nd i/c Major Duff
Adjutant Captain MacFarlan
Quartermaster Lt Studley
Medical Officer (attached) Lt Douglas RAMC
A Company Captain Eykyn; Lt Wauchope; 2/Lt Nunneley
B Company Captain Stewart; 2/Lt Ramsay; 2/Lt Bulloch
C Company Captain Cumming-Bruce; Lt Edmonds; 2/Lt West
D Company Major Cuthbertson; Lt Harvey; Lt St John Harvey
E Company Captain Elton; Lt Berthon; 2/Lt Gordon
F Company Major Berkeley; Lt Hamilton; Lt Drummond
G Company Major Maxwell; 2/Lt Grant; 2/Lt Ruthven
H Company Lt Cameron; Lt Tait; 2/Lt Innes

EMBARKATION

On 22nd October the 2nd Black Watch entrained at Aldershot for Tilbury Dock, from where it set sail on the SS Orient on the 24th, having been delayed by an accident to the screw followed by thick fog. Wauchope, on board the Cunard liner Aurania, cast off at 5.45pm on 23rd Oct and reports steaming for a few miles before dropping anchor, due to thick fog, and only getting underway again on the 24th.

The 2nd Black Watch had half a Btn of mounted infantry aboard with them whilst Wauchope sailed with the HLI plus some engineers and some mounted infantry. Meanwhile 2nd Seaforths set sail from Glasgow aboard the Mongolian on Oct 20th and the Argylls were on the SS Arcano.

All ships made a brief stop at St Vincent for coal. The Aurania arrived in Cape Town on Nov 11th at 10am and the Orient dropped anchor in Table Bay during the evening of Nov 13th and came alongside on the following afternoon. The Seaforths arrived on Nov 18th.



CONCENTRATING AT DE AAR

The British Army's communications and supplies were dependent upon the 3 railway lines running from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London. De Aar was the junction of the Port Elizabeth and Cape Town railways. This was the destination of the 2nd Black Watch when they entrained on the evening of Nov 14th and set off up the line in two trains early on the 15th.

There then followed a journey across the Karroo - a sandy desolate area, interspersed with isolated hills, and in places overgrown with scrub. The Veldt was mainly 4000ft above sea level and this single-track railway was the only sign of human habitation.

The BLACK WATCH was eventually to join Lord Methuen's western column aimed at the relief of Kimberley. Wauchope had already arrived at De Aar on Nov 13th to set up his HQ in a newly formed camp. The Highland Brigade commander met Methuen at Orange River Station where it was decided that the Highland Brigade should be employed on lines of communication with two btns stationed at De Aar and two at Orange River.

Wauchope returned to De Aar on the 17th Nov, to a rousing reception from his old regiment, in the form of 2nd Black Watch, who had just arrived.

NAAUWPOORT JUNCTION



On the 19th Nov Wauchope carried out an order to reoccupy Naauwpoort Junction. With him went half of 2nd Black Watch, half a Btn of Berkshires 70 NSW Lancers and two 9-pounder muzzleloaders. Fortuitously the train carrying the 2nd Black Watch had just passed over a culvert when it was blown up by the Boers.

Whilst here the 2nd Black Watch built earthworks and made a reconnaissance towards Colesberg where the Boers were in force. On the 23rd November C Company, under Captain Cumming-Bruce, when acting as part of an escort to General French's reconstruction train, came under fire from some Boers near Arundel.

Half the Btn stayed at Naauwpoort whilst the other half arrived at Orange River station arriving around Nov 28th.Officer's claymores had been left along with all sporrans. To replace the sporran an apron of khaki drill was worn and all ranks carried the rifle.

THE WIDER PICTURE

The original plan, of basically capturing Bloemfontein and Pretoria, was abandoned and the army corps was split into three, with one portion under Methuen aimed at the relief of Kimberley.

Kimberley was 75mls from Orange River Station, where Methuen was preparing his advance. Besides the Modder and Riet rivers the only obstacles to an advancing army were patches of hilly ground where the Boers could take up defensive positions. There were 3 in a direct line between Orange River and Kimberley-Belmont, Rooilaagte (between Graspan and Enslin stations) and between Magersfontein and Spytfontein.

Methuen intended to move along the railway, the protection of which was his main priority, as it was his supply line and means of moving out Kimberley's surplus population.

The Boers rightly assumed that Methuen would move along the railway and simply planned to hold defensive positions along it, at the successive points listed above, and invite attack.

If the attack proved too strong they would move back after inflicting maximum casualties. These were classic guerrilla tactics.

Methuen set off on Nov 21st and battles were fought by troops under his command at:

Nov 23rd Belmont 75 killed 220 wounded
Nov 25th Enslin or Graspan 17 killed 168 wounded
Nov 28th Modder River 70 killed 413 wounded

Generally these battles involved dislodging the Boers from high land and had been dearly bought in terms of casualties after frontal assaults. Modder River in particular involved heavy losses when the Boers fully utilised the power of their Mauser rifles firing on the level. To Methuen's surprise the Boers abandoned the position and withdrew to Magersfontein, which now blocked the way to Kimberley.

MODDER RIVER CAMP



Methuen was wounded on November 28th and left hospital on the 29th but had to return there between 2nd - 6th December. The advance was halted here in order for the troops to be rested and for reinforcements to be received. Supplies and ammunition came in from the south whilst engineers constructed a deviation bridge to take the railway across the Riet River (the railway was close to the confluence of the Riet and Modder Rivers). The temporary bridge was completely finished on December 10th.

On 2nd December, half of the 2nd Black Watch set out on a 55 mile march from Orange River Station towards the Modder River, whilst the remaining half came by train from Naauwpoort. The route of the march was Witte Putts-Van Der Wyck's farm -Enslin-Honey Nest Kloof. From here the Black Watch moved off at 4.15am on Dec 6th towards Wittkops farm and finally Modder River camp, which was reached on Dec 7th.

There was a halt of 4 days in order to complete the mobilisation of the troops and their transports. A Black Watch officer considered the morale in the camp to be poor as a result of Methuen's battering ram tactics and resultant casualties.

In some opinions it is believed that the delay at Modder River Camp was Methuen's biggest failure. Had he moved before December 4th he might have easily gained possession of Magersfontein.

THE MAGERSFONTEIN POSITION

From the Modder River the veldt stretched in a vast expanse for 5-6 miles until it met low ridges emanating diagonally from Langeberg farm on the north west, and which then continued across the railway, near Merton siding, and for three miles until they ended in the ship like promontory of Magersfontein Hill 150ft-200ft high.

BOER TRENCHES



There were Boer trenches (3-4ft deep and narrow giving complete protection from shrapnel fire) for about a mile Northwest from the railway behind Merton siding. There was then a gap before trenches began again east of the railway at the foot of a long low kopje, which projected in front of the general line of hills.

The main line of trenches round Magersfontein Hill began in the valley between it and this kopje, slightly overlapping those in front of the latter, and ran for about 500 yards to a point beyond the south eastern end of the hill in the pan or gap, which separated it from two low parallel ridges (never above 35ft and thickly covered in scrub), which swept for 3 miles to the south east, eventually dying away into the general level of the veldt, nearly 2 miles from the Modder.

In the right and centre the trenches were about 85 yards in front of the hills. It should be emphasised that these trenches were not continuous, but were dug along the waving foot line of the hills, and so arranged that they flanked one another. The parapets were slightly raised above the ground, but were concealed by bushes and stones. The total position was one of about nine miles in length.

On the 8th Dec the line of trenches was continued along the more easterly of the ridges, right across to the river at Moss Drift, 6 miles from Methuen's camp.

There were about 8000 Boers opposing Methuen in this position under the leadership of Cronje. The Boer strategist General De La Rey is credited with choosing the Magersfontein position instead of the intended Spytfontein site, as well as insisting on placing the trenches in front of the hill, and not on the crest. In this way there would be no dead ground at the foot of the hill, where an attacker could shelter before launching a bayonet assault on the slopes. Also the field of fire for the Mauser rifle was, in this way, maximised.

The fight at Modder River had demonstrated the advantage of placing the main firing line so that it should just be able to graze the surface of the country over which the British had to advance. In this way advantage was taken of the Mauser's flat trajectory.

In any discussion of the Boer defences it must be remembered that many of the field works were constructed after the battle on the 11th December.

The Boer's main laager was at Brown's Drift and Jacobsdal the principal base.

WIRE FENCES

Nor were trenches the only obstacle for the attacking troops as two high wire fences crossed the plain. One stretching away to the north-east marked the frontier of the Orange Free State, while the other ran across the trenches which guarded the centre of the Boer position.

METHUEN'S OPTIONS



Methuen had 3 basic options

[1] A flank march by Jacobsdal which would have meant recrossing the Modder, in face of the enemy and repeating the battle just fought.

[2] An advance up river to Brown's drift on the north bank or both.

[3] An attack on Magersfontein ridge.

He seemed to favour [2] covered by a feint along the railway. The occupation of the low ridges between Brown's drift and Magersfontein would have led to an abandonment of it. Methuen knew nothing of the weaknesses of the defences on the ridges, as his scouts could approach no nearer than one mile, especially after December 4th when Cronje's defence line moved south. His knowledge of the ground was limited to the immediate environs of the camp and information obtained from a reconnaissance by Major G E Benson and from the reports of patrols by scouts referred to above.



From these sources Methuen knew the enemy's main line of defence ran along the foothills stretching from Langeberg Farm to Magersfontein. Indeed prior to December 4th patrols had actually ridden over Magersfontein Ridge. It was known they had outposts on the low ridges that they held running towards Moss Drift, with detachments south of the river, and that there were laagers of considerable extent near Langeberg Farm and Brown's Drift.

Methuen eventually decided, influenced by his new Chief of Staff Colonel Douglas, to rush Magersfontein Hill from its southeastern end, following a night march.

The idea was to strike a heavy blow at the Boers and thereby avoid having his lines of communication threatened in the rear. In this Methuen was heavily influenced by what had taken place at Belmont where a similar night attack, in extended order, had been successful despite heavy losses.

Magersfontein kopje was considered the key, as its occupation would have split the Boer defences into two. The gap between the kopje and low ridges indicated the line of assault which would sweep around the base of the Bluff and take it on its south-eastern and eastern faces. Methuen estimated the Boer strength to be between twelve and fifteen thousand, with six to eight guns.

Methuen rode out on the afternoon of December 7th to explain his ideas to all of his staff, and brigades with the exception of Wauchope, who was dealing with Prinsloo's raid on Enslin but Wauchope was represented by his Brigade Major, Major Ewart. Wauchope met Methuen the next day, and told him that the Highland Brigade had been chosen to take Magersfontein and that all of the details would be left to him.

ORDERS FOR THE ATTACK ON MAGERSFONTEIN RIDGE (ISSUED ON DECEMBER 10TH)

[1] Enemy in occupation of koppies to north and north east of camp and also high round between Modder and Riet rivers.

[2] Intention of GOC to hold enemy on the north and to deliver an attack on the southern end of Magersfontein ridge. On the afternoon of Dec 10th the position will be bombarded; it will be assaulted on the 11th. With this end in view three columns will be formed.

[3] No 1 Column will assemble on ground NE of 9th brigade camp at 3pm on Dec 10th in the following formation: -
9th Lancers
Mounted Infantry
G battery RHA
Brigade Division RFA, 18th, 62nd, 75th and 65th Howitzer battery
Highland Brigade (in mass)
Bearer company, Highland brigade
2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry
Sec. TB.,RE
Balloon Sec RE

The CRA will arrange for a portion of the ammunition column to accompany this force.

[4] The advance will be directed on the southern end of Magersfontein Ridge.

[5] At 3pm the RHA cavalry and mounted infantry will advance covering the front from railway to Modder river: the mounted infantry forming escort to RHA. After reconnaissance the cavalry will withdraw to the right flank of the Highland brigade and protect that flank leaving a party to watch the left of the artillery.

[6] At 3.10pm the remainder of the column will advance on the southern edge of Magersfontein ridge keeping well under shelter of Outpost Ridge (concealed from view of enemy) in the following order: -
Advance guard-half battalion; followed at 2.30 by half battalion RFA;
remainder of force (except 2 Yorkshire LI) in the order of parade.

[7] The RFA will when within range open fire on the ridge applying to GOC Highland brigade for an escort.

[8] The remainder of column will form up concealed to right rear of artillery in action.

[9] 2nd Yorkshire LI will proceed, from place of assembly, along the N bank of Modder River (under the guidance of Rimington's Guides), to Bridle's Drift or as it was known Voetpads Drift, 4 miles up river, where they will entrench themselves against attack from all sides- especially from northeast to south.

[10] Half rations for 11th Dec will be carried in haversacks. One blanket per man will be carried.

[11] Tents will not be struck.

[12] No. 2 Column, under Major-Gen. Pole-Carew, composed of 1 battalion, 9th Brigade, Naval brigade (with 4.7 inch gun) and Rimington's Guides will assemble at such hour and place as may be fixed by him, so that the column will be in position at 4pm, to co-operate with No.1 column, making a diversion against Magersfontein ridge, along the railway. This force will remain in position on the night of the 10th and will recommence the bombardment on the morning of the 11th; but the fire is on no account to be directed on the southern end of the ridge which the Infantry will be assaulting.

[13] No.3 column will consist of 12th lancers, No.7 Field Company RE, Guards Brigade; Bearer Company Guards brigade, Field hospitals Guards' and Highland brigades and divisional troops, ammunition column. This column commanded by Major-Gen. Sir H Colvile, will assemble on the same ground as No.1 column, at such hour, so as to enable it to reach 500 yards to the left rear of the RFA brigade division of No.1 column, by 3am on the 11th. A staff officer of No.3 column will accompany No.1 column to ascertain

[14] The supply column, with 5 days rations, escorted by half Gordon Highlanders, will assemble at the place of assembly of No.1 column, at 4am on the 11th, and will follow its route for two miles and await orders.

The total force available to Methuen was approximately 15,000 officers and men.

WAUCHOPE WITH METHUEN



On Saturday afternoon December 9th Wauchope had a conversation with Methuen in the hotel which was used for headquarters. When he came out he said to Colonel Douglas, Methuen's Chief Staff Officer, "I do not like the idea of this night march". Colonel Douglas urged Wauchope to see Methuen again, but he did not go back. The written orders for the march were received at Gen.Wauchope's quarters at 7.00 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 10th. Later in the day he assembled the Officers commanding the four battalions in the Highland Brigade and explained how he proposed to carry out the operation.

EVENTS OF DECEMBER 10TH 1899

At 2.30 p.m. on Sunday 10th December, in pouring rain, the 2nd Black Watch paraded, along with the rest of the Highland Brigade (about 4000 men in all), at Modder River Camp, for the attack on Magersfontein Ridge.

At the same time the 9th Lancers and 4 batteries of artillery moved off. The Lancers were to protect the right flank of the brigade.

Every man carried a blanket, a rifle, 150 rounds of ammunition, and his mess tin. Every other man carried a one pound tin of beef.

A and B Companies of 2nd Black Watch were the advanced guard of the brigade which proceeded 3 to 4 miles in a NE direction, to the bivouac area at Headquarters Hill.

From there the Black Watch, on the left and the cavalry on the right, advanced in extended order to within one thousand yards of Magersfontein without a shot being fired. Some wire fences in their path were cut and removed. Presumably the purpose of this movement was to get the Boers to reveal their positions, but without success.

At 4.30 p.m. the guns opened fire for a two hour bombardment during which the Battalion lay down in the pouring rain. The whole artillery - naval gun at 7000 yards on the left, howitzers at 4000 yards west of HQ hill and the 3 field batteries in line on the right at 2700 yards - pounded Magersfontein.

Eventually the shelling ceased at 6.30 p.m. The rain had stopped in the afternoon but a heavy thunderstorm broke later that evening. At dark the Battalion withdrew 2 miles, and bivouacked near to the dam behind Headquarters Hill, in mass of quarter column.

RESULTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT

[1] Boers lost 3 men wounded.

[2] The Boers now knew the attack was imminent.

[3] The Boers had confidence that their trenches provided protection.

[4] The Boers did not reveal their positions by firing any kind of gun.

As Captain Stewart of B Company said " Thus having given the Boers due warning that we were likely to attack first thing in the morning we retired and bivouacked together one highland regiment behind the other"

Another interesting aside resulting from the bombardment was the comment from a Black Watch sergeant who had noticed dust of a peculiar colour when shells fell short and concluded that trenches must be there. Needless to say the observation was ignored.

After the bombardment Methuen held a final meeting at which Wauchope said that he understood his orders.

THE PLAN FOR DECEMBER 11th

During the still wetter evening of Dec 10th Colonel Coode explained, to his officers, that the Brigade would set off on a night march at 12.30am, in mass of quarter column, led by Major Benson RA towards the southeast point of the main ridge.

The marching formation was the closest possible so they wouldn't lose touch with each other. Each Company was drawn up, shoulder to shoulder, in 2 lines with a third line of supernumeraries. Company followed Company, with 6 paces between companies and 8 between battalions.

The Highland brigade would have resembled a dense moving quadrilateral 45 yards in width and 170 yards or 90 files in depth. There would be 30 Companies as 2 Companies of Seaforths were detailed for outpost duties (they worked their way back to the formation later in the day). There was no alternative way under the conditions of getting such a large body of men to within striking distance of the target.

At the foot of the hill the brigade would deploy to the left at 5 paces interval. 2 Black Watch would be posted on the right, the Seaforths in the centre and the Argylls on the left with the HLI, the rear Battalion, forming the second line. Each battalion was to have 2 Companies in the firing line, 2 in support and 4 in reserve. The extension would take place under cover of darkness and the men would lie down until the time came to advance, up the hill, with bayonets fixed. The total extension would be about 2500 yards.

It was understood that the enemy was on the crest of the hill and that a partial turning movement would therefore be necessary.

DISPOSITION OF THE BOERS

1) To the west of the railway were the Orange Free State Commandos with a portion of the Potchefstroom Commando. This latter was eventually to reinforce the Boer left wing.

2) To the north east of Merton Siding running from the north west to the south east were the Fauresmith Commando and the Ladybrand Commando.

3) On the kopje to the east of Magersfontein was the Potchefstroom Commando.

4) On Magersfontein Kop were the Bloemfontein Commando, Kroonstad Commando and the Hoopstad Commando.

5) The Scandinavian Corps, which was about sixty strong, linked the centre with the left wing approximately one thousand yards in front of the main line.

6) Behind the Scandinavians were the Orange Free State Commandos, consisting of a portion of the Kroonstad, Heilbron, Bethlehem Ladybrand and Ficksburg Commandos.

7) On the low ridge on the left of the position running north to south, were to be found the Bloemhof, Lichtenberg and the Wolmaransstad Commandos.

8) South of the River near Moss Drift was a portion of the Fauresmith and Jacobsdal Commandos.

THE NIGHT MARCH



At 12.30am, having spent 6 hours getting soaking wet; the Highland Brigade moved off in the order 2 Black Watch, Seaforths, Argylls, and HLI. Captain Benson, who had reconnoitred the position and fixed the compass bearings for the direction of the march, led them. These were 45 degrees for 1000 yards then 32 degrees on to Magersfontein - an estimated total distance of 3300 yard advance. Benson was aiming for a point about 800 yards south of the south eastern point of Magersfontein where they were to deploy before 3a.m. In this Captain Cumming-Bruce assisted him. The General marched on the left, at the head of the column.

Whilst charging the magazines two rifles were accidentally discharged in the brigade but the storm, which had broken within half an hour of setting off, must have prevented the report being heard. The thundery rain, which reached its height around 2a.m, was to be one of the crucial factors that slowed down the column's rate of progress.

The Boers new that the attack was coming and really only needed to know the time. Captain Stewart noted that, as soon as they started out, a light from the top of the Kopje, apparently at a signal from somewhere near the Brigade, went out.

It was also a moonless night made totally dark by the mass of dark cloud accompanying the storm. The terrain being covered was uneven, rocky and boulder strewn, littered with ant heaps and interspersed with waist high belts of prickly mimosa. In addition, the sandy veldt had been turned into a muddy morass, by the rain.

The only light was coming from flashes of lightning and the violet beam of Kimberley's searchlight. To try and facilitate the direction of the column remaining true, the left guide of each company (the N.C.O.'s on the left of each Company) in the Black Watch and the Argylls held a rope knotted every 10 yards. On the right confusion developed to such an extent that Captain Stewart found Seaforths mixed up with his own men of B Company. As well as this, each man held the kilt of the man in front, whilst Major Ewart walked up and down the directing flank, calling out in a whisper, the names of the Company officers and assuring himself they were in the correct place.

However progress was slow with the column falling behind schedule by the minute. The men were constantly stumbling and falling over reducing the marching rate to about one-mile an hour. Adding to the time being lost were compass checks that had to be made as the column made its erratic way to its destiny. The storm and local ironstone and 4000 rifles were blamed for the behaviour of Benson's compass. The truth lies in the compass becoming waterlogged.

At 2a.m the torrential rain had clogged the compass and Benson became uncertain whether the column had not drifted away to the left. Wauchope sent back for Ewart and after a brief consultation a slight change of direction to the right was made. This was not easy under the prevailing conditions. The inclination to the right was given to the column and the advance resumed.

At about 2.30a.m the rain stopped and the outline of the hill was now dimly visible at approximately 1000 yards range. Major Benson informed Wauchope that in his opinion the point had been reached where the Brigade had to deploy. It has to be remembered that it would take fifteen minutes for the brigade to fully deploy into the correct formation, with the leading companies having to advance several hundred yards for the brigade to acquire the necessary depth. Both Hughes-Hallett of the Seaforths and Kelham of the HLI thought that they were too near not to deploy.

For whatever reason Wauchope decided to go on maintaining the mass of quarter column for about another 200 yards before deciding to deploy. Unfortunately this coincided with the leading Black Watch companies running into a vicious belt of prickly mimosa shortly after 3a.m. This could only be passed through with great difficulty. Wauchope led the Black Watch in single file through the bush and Ewart guided the remainder around the obstruction. The 3 battalions in rear easily avoided the small patch of thorny shrubs and rejoined more quickly than expected and soon fell into their proper places. The column had now formed up on the other side with the right close to a barbed wire fence and was wheeled half- left. It was now getting light at around 3.20a.m.



The Highlanders were about an hour behind schedule and at a range of 700-800 yards with Magersfontein ridge discernible in the gloom. They were however too far to the left and there remained no time to deploy under cover of darkness. Orders then came to deploy, once Ewart had reported the arrival of battalions, but to the right, not left. Under Colonel Coode's direction A Company, the leading Company, went forward at 3.35 a.m., extended to 5 paces, while B Company, each half company in single rank, followed in support. The Argylls and Seaforths were to deploy either side of 2 Black Watch - Seaforths to the left and Argylls to the right.

A Company had advanced 150 yards, with B 70 yards behind, and the Seaforths and two Companies of Argylls were in the act of extending, when the foot of the hill in front of them, 400 yards distant, burst into a sheet of flame. It was now around 4am.

THE BATTLE

Wauchope Killed

It was only now that Wauchope, at the head of the leading Black Watch Companies, realised that there were defenders at the foot of the hill. He was too far west and the half wheel left had taken the leading Companies between two spurs so that they were fired on from three sides. The Scandinavian Brigade was able to enfilade the Brigade from the right, as they fired from their position, in advance of the gap, between the kopje and low ridges. Outflanking was only possible by deploying to the Argylls and Seaforths to the right of the Black Watch. He ordered his cousin Lt A G Wauchope to pass back the order to reinforce to the right.

A few moments after Coode had received the order he was killed, and when A G returned he found General Wauchope lying dead. Almost immediately he fell dangerously wounded. The brigade was without orders. All three were found close together within 200 yards of the trenches.

The Opening Volley



To 2/Lt Bulloch of B Company left at the head of the column by A's deployment the scene was almost indescribable: - " You can't possibly imagine the number of bullets that came whistling over us. Talk of hailstones: that would have been a trifle to it."

It was difficult for any of the troops, other than the leading Companies, to return fire, as they were in mass formation and behind.

Yet Magersfontein was not lost at this stage as many shots went harmlessly overhead. The casualties, although considerable, especially among the officers of the leading companies, were only a small fraction of the total suffered by the Brigade later. Captain Stewart recorded that he saw no one touched at this initial stage.

The Brigade had been surprised in close formation at the halt and in the process of exchanging one formation for another. As a soldier of the Highland Light Infantry said "In the formation we were in we were helpless". In other words transferring from marching formation to fighting formation, which requires time, was almost impossible under close fire. As a result the opening fusillade produced panic amidst a flood of contradictory commands to Lie Down! Fix Bayonets! Charge! Extend left! Extend right! and Retire! A contagious panic in a close formation was natural in that situation and, despite the efforts of officers to keep men lying down, a mob of broken men stampeded back to the line of bushes.

It was amongst the two rear battalions that the chaos, following the outburst of fire, was at its worst. An Argyll officer likened it to "a hurricane wind", and an HLI officer, to "an avalanche". Those who responded to "lie down" were trampled and those who tried to extend were pushed back. Neilson's Company of Argylls received the order to retire "like a roar" and broke.

At the line of bushes officers rallied the men. Kelham led forward a number of the HLI, with men of all kilted battalions, to support Hughes-Hallett.

The Advanced Companies

The 2nd Black Watch, and to some extent the Seaforths, being in the process of deployment were less affected by the panic and mostly obeyed the commands given. A Company, in the lead, had followed Wauchope's order to lie down, and fire, whilst waiting for the Brigade to deploy. B then doubled up in line fixing bayonets as it did so. Part of C Company under Lt Edmonds - Captain Cumming-Bruce had been mortally wounded just behind A Company - ran forward to the ranks of A and B so that they were almost shoulder to shoulder. There was an extension to the right as the line was formed. These companies were within 250-300 yards of the Boer trenches and it was impossible to go beyond this.

Part of F Company under 2/Lt Maurice Drummond, who was hit almost at once in the thigh, came into the ranks of A Company at a place where 2/Lt Nunneley, and a few men, were in a small trench. Lt F G Tait also brought some of F into the ranks of B but the bulk of this company, under Major Mowbray Berkeley, deployed with the rest of the battalion to the right.

As the leading Companies were enfiladed, two forward rushes were made to enable the men to spread out a little, then they settled down to deliberate firing from behind such shelter as they could find. Isolated as they were, from the rest of the brigade, fire was coming from behind, from another regiment, replying to the Boer fire.

Captain Stewart wrote: - "After a while I looked back to see what was coming on and lo and behold, Nobody! ... The only way we were supported at any time was being fired at from somewhere in the rear by one of our own men."

At daylight from the spot where Lt. Tait, hit in the leg, lay under a small thorn tree, to where, some one hundred and twenty yards away, Lt. Arthur Wauchope lay wounded in both legs, there were not fifteen men untouched. It was here that Black Watch casualties were heaviest. General Wauchope was forty yards to the left of Lt. A. Wauchope, Colonel Coode just between A and B Companies, with Lt. Edmonds some yards to A G's left and finally Captain Cumming-Bruce.

After two hours ammunition began to run out but by collecting it from the dead and wounded and only firing when a Boer exposed himself, fire was kept up until 10am.

At about 5am artillery fire began and kept the Boer fire down. This was achieved once they realised that the Boers were not holding the Ridge, but trenches cut at the foot of the Hill, and, therefore, reduced their range accordingly. Although some shells fell short amongst Stewart's men, causing casualties, the benefit outweighed the losses. Undoubtedly the Artillery saved the Infantry from suffering a complete debacle.

Again Stewart wrote: - "About 10am I could find only three sound men within 30 yards either side. We all hugged mother earth pretty close after we had finished our rounds. I was so sleepy I went to sleep about 3pm as did everyone else."

Able neither to advance or retire there was nothing for it but to stay put. Lying absolutely still under baking sun men slept or smoked praying they didn't move or that the glint of sunshine on a water bottle didn't catch the eye of a sniper. This advanced party of around 200 strong waited all day for reinforcement and was too weakened to charge.

Early in the afternoon around 2pm while Stewart was asleep his second in command Archie Bulloch noted: - "the boss of the Boers came out and waved his arms to show that he was not armed. He then came up to us and said he had sent to Lord Methuen to ask about ambulances. But he said that if we would not fire on their ambulance when it came up they would not fire on us as long as we lay still and didn't get up. Of course we agreed as by that time there was no one within a mile of us except the guns."

At 6pm, after an ordeal which had lasted 14 hours, they were again approached. This time two Boers came across bringing water to the wounded. Addressing themselves to Stewart they declared that if his men left their arms behind them they might retire in perfect safety adding that they didn't want to take prisoners.

Stewart argued for a while even accompanying the men over to their trenches where to his surprise he found the Boers quite "a decent lot." Arguing was useless as the Boers held the upper hand. Bulloch continues " so all that could walk retired and so ended our first days fighting and I never want to have another like it."

Led by Stewart and Bulloch about 25 men withdrew reaching the brigade bivouac around 9pm where they had their first food since midday Sunday. A Company had 23 killed, 28 wounded; B Company 15 killed, 40 wounded and C about the same.

THE MAJORITY OF THE BATTALION-GROUPS PUSHING THROUGH ROUND TO THE EAST



When fire commenced the battalion moved to the right at the double and each company turned to the front as it got clear. D E and F Companies went through two wire fences and shortly after going through the second Lt N Ramsay was killed not more than 200 yards from the Boer trenches. Owing to the small spur west of B on the map all these men lost touch with those of A B and C Companies on the left of the spur.

At the same time Lt. Colonel Hughes-Hallett of the Seaforths, the only CO untouched, (Lt-Col Goff of the Argylls had been killed and Lt-Colonel Kelham of the HLI had been lightly wounded but had been trampled over and carried away by the stampede), swung the Seaforths to the right, where their leading Companies got tangled up with the Black Watch.

Together they pushed forward into the gap to the right of the Boer trenches, crawling through the wire fences (not barbed wire), one of which ran along to the left of the road and which had apparently been drawn back till the trenches were met.

Twenty minutes approximately had passed since the opening shots and now several hundred Black Watch and Seaforths had made their way round to the eastern foot of the hill.

A party of 90-100 men under Captain MacFarlan the Black Watch adjutant (who had been hit in the wrist in the first fire) went up the south eastern section of the hill to the point marked B. They were stopped by fire from Boers in sangars, from in front and above, as well as by friendly fire from behind plus shrapnel from the British artillery. They fell back to F where they took shelter in the dead ground for a while, but when the guns opened up, right on target, a further retreat was necessitated, and most were killed including Captain MacFarlan.

Lts Cox and Wilson of the Seaforths led a mixed company of about 100 round by the point F, to which place Sgt Fraser of the Black Watch had managed to bring some more men. In the dead ground, and almost round the reverse of the hill, they now swung round and began to climb. The Boers were nearly taken by surprise from the rear by this group who, given another minute, would have been on the crest of Magersfontein Ridge. The story goes that they bumped into Cronje and 6 of his adjutants who opened fire as Cronje shouted " Schiet, kerels, Schiet" or "Shoot, boys, shoot"

At this point the Boers, to the east of the pan, began to push forward to close the gap through which the brigade was threatening to advance. This followed the destruction of the Scandinavian Brigade, probably as much by shelling, as from the Seaforth's Bayonets. As a result the advancing Black Watch and Seaforths were enfiladed. The artillery prevented any support reaching the force clinging to the slopes. Eventually cut off, and fired on from in front and behind, and raked by British shrapnel, they wavered and rushed downhill in the direction of the pan and towards the rising ground behind, where they were surrounded. 30-40 survivors were taken prisoner, although the Official History records some making good their retreat, to the right of the Brigade. The Boers, following up this success, pressed the right wing of the most advanced Highlanders in flank and gradually drove it back. In all respects the night attack had now failed; this was around 8 a.m.

SUPPORTING LINE OF THE SEAFORTH

It was British shrapnel that made the Companies at the north point D fall back to the line EE at 7.00 a.m. under a severe enfilading fire from the Boer trench on the right.

This line held until 10am when the casualties were so heavy, and ammunition had run out, that it was no longer feasible to do so. The line then fell back a short way, facing still more to the right i.e. ENE on to a supporting line of Seaforths.

Here was to be found mainly E, G and H Companies.

THE GENERAL POSITION AFTER 6 AM

From 6am onwards the Highland Brigade lay scattered in little groups and straggling lines along a front of fully 3 miles and at distances of from 200-600 yards from the trenches.

Attempts to rush the trenches were futile. For the rest of the morning the men lay, exposed to pitiless short-range fire, with their faces pressed flat against the hot sand and the bare insides of their knees blistering in the burning sun. Water bottles were empty and the only food available was the meagre rations carried.

Hundreds of otherwise unwounded Highlanders were completely lame for several days afterwards and as much under the doctor as their wounded comrades. A Black Watch corporal later wrote "Between 5.25am and 4pm I don't think I moved one foot either way."

THE DISASTROUS RETIREMENT

The Seaforth's line was courageously counter-attacked by the Ficksburg Commando working round from clump to clump on the right. Hughes-Hallett writes: - " About 1pm I found that a large party of the enemy were getting round my right flank and a very heavy fire was poured in on us from here and at the same time on the left. I then saw that it was necessary to swing round a bit to my right to intercept this movement and I ordered the men near me to get round to the right which we did under very heavy fire from the trenches in front. At this moment an order was passed down to retire... I have since ascertained that the order was given by Lt-Colonel Downman who was on my left when he also found that our position was untenable on account of the movement on our flank."

Hughes-Hallett intended to confine the swing back to two Companies only but the Boers advancing on their heels were soon in a position to enfilade the Gordons further down the line. To meet this threat Downman, two miles away, reacted in the same way as Hughes-Hallett, whom he knew to be in command.

Near Downman was Captain Towse VC who wrote " It was then for the first time that I saw Downman; he came running along the line from the left giving the order to swing back to the right. He was stooping as he ran and signalling with his arm and was hit and fell, about 30 yards to my left."

Kelham of the HLI who was to the rear said, " I saw the whole line rise up and slowly retire so deliberately that I felt sure it was the result of an order."

This was around 1.30p.m.

The target of 3000 men retreating was too easy a target for the Boers and it was now that most casualties were incurred. Assailed by vicious fire a retirement became a rout. These heavy losses could have been avoided had Methuen's order to hold on until nightfall reached the troops. The only Black Watch Officer to receive the order was Lt. Ruthven, who had made contact with the Guards on the left, brought in his party from the extreme right to rejoin the rest of the Battalion after darkness fell.

An eye witness wrote "then I saw a sight that I hope I may never see again; men of the Highland Brigade running for all they were worth, others cowering under bushes, behind the guns, some lying under their blankets, officers running about with revolvers threatening to shoot them, urging on some, kicking on others; staff officers galloping about giving incoherent and impracticable orders".

It was well over half a mile before officers and NCOs stopped the rot and sorted the Highlanders into some kind of order. The men were re-formed at about 3.30 p.m. in rear of the 18th and 62nd Batteries. But having passed out of rifle range, one thousand yards from the trenches, it was impossible to lead them back before they ate and drank. It was now about 4 p.m.

When the men swarmed around the food and water carts they presented a target to the Boer gunners who had been quiet all day. The men were just forgetting their cares when "from near the top of the central kopje there was a puff of grey smoke, the scream of a shell and a big shrapnel shell fell fortunately a few yards too far……. It was the first gun fired by the Boers during the day. The effect was magical: the men wearied and over done, shaken by the decimation of the morning simply melted away and the efforts of the few officers and the rally of the pipes were alike, vain to stem the retreat".

The Scots Guards occupying positions some one thousand yards from the trenches filled the gap left by the Highland Brigades' withdrawal.

THE END OF THE BATTLE



The Brigade was finally brought back to a spot just west of the bivouac occupied on the previous night. The cold, after the heat of the day, was very uncomfortable for the wounded, most of who lay out all night. The Boers gave them water, but they had no medical attention till next day. The Medical Officer Lt H E M Douglas attached from RAMC, was wounded working under fire for which he won the VC. The following morning stand to was 3.30 a.m. and the order was to march back to Modder River Camp.

QUOTES

Charles Stewart of the Black Watch said, "The Black Watch behaved as they should, I think, but I have heard some queer stories of other regiments."

F G Tait said "The Black Watch never retired ----- what other regiments did I only know from hearsay".

A Seaforth Sergeant said "The Black Watch in front could stand it no longer and were driven back in the Seaforths throwing them into confusion"

An Argyll Officer said of the Black Watch and Seaforths "They turned and bolted"

Colonel Kelham said "The troops in front were thrown into complete disorder"

Tait said of Wauchope "General Wauchope is in no way responsible. I feel certain that, if we had been led up in line, we should have rushed the position, with probably a quarter of the loss we actually suffered. The formation was alright if we had deployed sooner".

CASUALTY FIGURES

Source 1: OFFICIAL HISTORY

OFFICERS OTHER RANKS
KILLED WOUNDED MISSING KILLED WOUNDED MISSING
BRITISH ARMY 22 46 1 188 629 62
HIGHLAND BRIGADE 15 30 173 529
BLACK WATCH 7 11 86 199


The Boers had 87 killed and 188 wounded.

ANALYSIS

The Black Watch had 32% of all British Officers killed and 47% of all Highland Brigade Officers killed. They had 24% of all British Officers wounded and 37% of Highland Brigade Officers wounded.

The Black Watch had 46% of all British Other Ranks killed and 50% of all Highland Brigade Other Ranks killed. They had 32% of all British Other Ranks wounded and 38% of all Highland Brigade Other Ranks wounded.

SOURCE 2: A G WAUCHOPE HISTORY OF THE BLACK WATCH 1725 - 1907

He states the Black Watch went into action with 25 Officers and 918 men. Of these, 7 Officers and 86 Other Ranks were killed, and 11 Officers and 198 Other Ranks wounded, 42 were taken prisoner, some of who were wounded.

SOURCE 3: TULLIBARDINE MILITARY HISTORY OF PERTHSHIRE

This records the same Officer casualties as Wauchope, but has 88 Other Ranks killed and 207 wounded. Also 42 are recorded captured when those who had started to climb the hill fell back at the commencement of the artillery barrage.

MULTIPLICITY OF WOUNDS

Tullibardine records several instances of wounded men being hit several times.

Private Williamson 3843, this man was wounded in the left foot, left thigh, left arm (humerus fractured), left shoulder, right shoulder and right leg. He lay on the field of battle for two days and a night.

Lance Corporal Ramsay 6724, this man had four bullets through the left leg and two through the right; one was embedded in his right elbow and one grazed the heart. The left leg was also fractured by shrapnel shell.



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