THE PART PLAYED BY THE SECOND BLACK WATCH IN THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG
NOTE
In the following account where divergences amongst authorities have
occurred I have followed the course of events as laid down in Black
Watch histories.
BACKGROUND
The battle of Paardeberg was fought on February 18th 1900. For the
second Black Watch it was the second battle in succession, following on
from Magersfontein, during which it suffered unnecessary
casualties. Since Magersfontein there had been changes in command for
the second Black Watch, the Highland Brigade, and indeed the British
Army itself. Lt/Col A. M. Carthew-Yorstoun now commanded the second Black
Watch, General Hector MacDonald the Highland Brigade and Lord Roberts
was commander-in-chief of the army with Lord Kitchener as chief of
staff.
THE PLAN
Lord Roberts had devised a plan which involved launching a flank march
from the Kimberley Railway towards Bloemfontein. A diversion would have
to made to relieve Kimberley due to its symbolical importance to both
sides and the inability of its inhabitants to endure the siege for
much longer. The threat to the Boer capitals would logically move
Cronje from his entrenched position at Magersfontein. Once on the move
Cronje would be trapped and dealt a killer blow.
THE TACTICS
The tactics were for the 1st division(Methuen) to contain Cronje at
Magersfontein with the cavalry under French securing the crossings of
the Riet and Modder before swinging off to relieve Kimberley. The
infantry would follow occupying point after point as the cavalry
pushed forward. The problem of obtaining water limited the choice of
route that the force would take.
Ramdam was the only place with enough water between the railway and
the Riet and was therefore selected as the place where all of the
force would concentrate. In total some 30000 combatants were to pass
through.
THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE
The second Black Watch was a part of the 3rd Brigade(Highland Brigade)
which along with the 19th Brigade formed the 9th Division commanded by
Lt/Gen Sir H. E. Colvile. The relative strengths of the Highland Brigade
were:- Second Black Watch 649 1st Highland Light Infantry 950 Second
Seaforths 703 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 819.
THE BEGINNING
On the 9th February 1900 the second Black Watch were at Modder river
camp. Along with the rest of the 9th Division they were due to
concentrate at Ramdam on February 13th. Accordingly on February 12th
they moved by rail to Enslin 18 miles to the south and at 6am on the
13th began marching to Ramdam acting as an escort to an ammunition
column. Paardeberg was to be reached in stages.
FEBRUARY 14th
Starting at 4. 30am the battalion left Ramdam marching by a fairly good
road and reached the Riet river at Waterval Drift by noon. Here the
Riet ran in a deep channel with very steep banks. This and the
simultaneous arrival of the 9th Division, army convoy and the
ammunition park, while the whole cavalry supply park was still
crossing, caused a great block of vehicles of all kinds on the left
bank.
FEBRUARY 15th
The second Black Watch as part of the Highland Brigade started for
Wegdraai at 1am along with the divisional artillery and naval guns. By
4am the 9th Division had reached Wegdraai. The oxen transport were left
at Waterval after orders from Lord Roberts under the escort of 200
infantry and about the same number of mounted men.
The convoy was parked 1000 yards north east of Waterval Drift when the
Boers opened long range fire on it sometime after 7am. All of the
wagons were captured after Roberts decided upon abandonment and given
that they contained supplies for the column this had serious
consequences for the troops daily ration. Altogether 176 wagons were
abandoned.
CRONJE'S REACTION
Cronje in his trenches at Magersfontein knew that French had pierced
the Boer line, Kimberley had been relieved, Jacobsdal occupied and that
heavy enemy columns were to the south east. The conclusion had to be
that he and his commandos were in extreme danger. Orders were then
issued to evacuate Magersfontein and move up the right bank of the
Modder. The trek began at 10pm on the 15th February.
FEBRUARY 16th
The Highland Brigade was ordered to stay at Wegdraai to take the place
of a 7th division brigade which had been sent back to Waterval in an
attempt to rescue the convoy. The rest of the 9th division marched on
to Jacobsdal so as to make certain of the new lines of communication
with Modder river camp by which a fresh convoy with 4 days supplies
would it was hoped arrive the following day.
The second Black Watch left Wegdraai at 11pm along with the rest of
the Highland Brigade and the 7th and 8th Mounted Infantry.
FRENCH ORDERED TO CUT OFF CRONJE
Late on the night of the 16th (around 10pm) French had received orders
to move in a south easterly direction via Boschvarkfontein so that the
Boer convoy could be cut off at Koodoos Drift. The main body of the
Boers had reached Cronje at Wolverkraal at about 8am on the 17th where
they planned to rest before crossing the Modder by Vendutie
Drift. Meanwhile French had left Kimberley at 4. 30am for Koodoos
Drift. He arrived in time to set up an artillery position at 2100 yards
range from Vendutie Drift and from which the first shells were fired
at around 11. 15am just as the Boer convoy prepared to cross the
drift. The convoy was halted and remained at Vendutie.
FEBRUARY 17TH
The second Black Watch arrived at Klip Kraal Drift at 5. 30am after a
16 miles march. They were 4 miles upstream from the rest of the 9th
Division which was at Klip Drift having left Jacobsdal at 10pm on the
16th and arrived at 4. 30am on the 17th.
Colvile sent a message to MacDonald that he intended to resume his
march around 3pm and that the Highland Brigade was to keep ahead of
him.
The battalion rested until 5pm when it set off to cover the 15 miles
to Koodoos Drift until orders from the chief of staff turned it
towards Paardeberg Drift where it bivouacked around midnight. The
Highland Light Infantry had been left behind to hold Klip Drift. A
total of 31 miles had been covered in around 24 hours. During the
previous days marches only 25 of the battalion had fallen out and 51
admitted to hospital.
FEBRUARY 18TH
Three hours later MacDonald was joined by Colvile with his divisional
troops and the 19th Brigade. It was believed that Kitchener along with
Lt/Gen Kelly-Kenny's 6th Division were somewhere nearby but there was
no definitive news. The dawn of February 18th 1900 was fast
approaching.
CRONJE'S LAAGER
Cronje's laager was on the north bank of the Modder at
Wolvekraal, Vendutie Drift. It was in a hollow about 9 miles long by
6miles wide encircled by surrounding heights but with a clear field of
fire on both banks. At this point the Modder ran through a deep wooded
trough thus affording a natural fortress. It entered the basin at the
east by a gorge under the southern slopes of Koodesrand and emerged at
the west by a defile between Paardeberg and signal hills.
The banks of the Modder were steep, 50 yards apart, and had an average
height of 30ft. In addition they were covered with mimosa thorn and
other scrub which gave excellent cover on an otherwise bare plain. Many
ravines or dongas ran into the river providing ready made trenches for
the Boer defenders. These dongas were difficult to search with shrapnel
making them an even harder obstacle to capture.
Within the basin there were several fords. The most eastern was
Koodoos, then Banks, Vanderberg, Vendutie and Paardeberg. Recent heavy
rains had caused the stream to rise and to make its passage difficult.
By two ponts near Vendutie Drift connection was kept up between the
main body of Boers on the right bank and 400 men who were detached to
the south of the river.
During the night of 17th/18th Cronje's men worked incessantly to
strengthen their defences. Pits were sunk into the soft earth of the
river banks and trenches made along the top of the right bank, the
higher of the two, for about 1. 5 miles above Vendutie Drift and on the
left bank for about half of that distance. A mound of earth was thrown
up to protect the wagons still on the open veldt.
Thus the Boer position, although encircled and commanded by higher
ground, formed a redoubt of some strength centred, as it was, on Vendutie
Drift. There was an effective range of fire over the whole plain whilst
the dongas provided flanking fire. The big donga on the north bank was
a formidable outwork which had to be captured before the laager could
be approached from the west.
Cronje had resolved to repeat the tactics that he had used
successfully against Methuen at Modder river by turning the bend of
the stream into a fortification of which the laager at Vendutie was
the central point.
KITCHENER'S ROLE
Unfortunately Lord Roberts was not to be present to direct his forces
on February 18th. He was ill with a feverish chill at
Jacobsdal. Kitchener was his chief of staff and not his second in
command. Strictly as a chief of staff he should not have been on the
march and in terms of rank he was junior to Kelly-Kenny, Colvile and
French. However Roberts notified Kelly-Kenny, and him only, that
Kitchener "was with him for the purpose of communicating to you my
orders so that there maybe no delay such as references may entail. "
Kitchener was bivouacked with the Mounted Infantry 2 miles south of
Paaredeberg drift. Owing to the dispersion of troops it had not been
possible to make arrangements with Kelly-Kenny or Colvile about the
way in which executive orders were to be issued. Thus the officer in
charge of the whole force had no means through which he could organise
and direct combined movements.
The ensuing battle in which Kitchener was thus to be ostensibly in
charge was to be the most controversial episode in his career.
KITCHENER'S PLAN
Kitchener had two options. The first was to encircle the enemy's
position and shell him into surrender. The second was to assault the
river fortress at once. He decided to attack at once believing that
encirclement would not have been complete by nightfall and would
therefore have allowed the Boers to dash through and meet up with the
reinforcements that were on the way.
Kitchener's plan of action was to engage and occupy the attention of
the Boers from the south bank whilst he attacked the laager from both
west and east.
The Highland Brigades part in the plan was to march on the laager
eastwards along the river upstream from the west. It was it seems to
have been left to MacDonald's discretion whether he should make his
way along the left bank only or along both.
Kitchener wanted to act quickly to capture Cronje's whole force
especially as Boer reinforcements were expected. However at 3am when
Kitchener issued his first orders to Hannay he had seen neither
Kelly-Kenny or Colvile. Colvile had in fact only just arrived and did
not see Kitchener until 2pm on the 18th.
Unfortunately both his divisional Generals were equally eager to deal
with the situation and knowing nothing of what Kitchener intended to
do had already begun to act long before any instructions from him had
reached them.
THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG
As the second Black Watch was a part of the Highland Brigade which in
turn belonged to the 9th Division, the decisions of General Colvile
and of General MacDonald were crucial to it.
Colvile nor any of his staff had knowledge of the total situation.
Therefore, the AAG Col. J. S. Ewart was directed to reconnoitre. He
worked his way up the left bank of the Modder and discovered the site
of Cronje's Laager and ascertained that some Bores were making their
way from it down the river bed.
At 5 am Colvile was raised by Ewart who reported that the enemy was
advancing from the East. As nothing could be clearly seen from the
bivouac apart from Paardeberg Kopje on the North side and a stony
ridge running round the skyline Colvile got on his horse and went a
point on the ridge which gave the best view.
He saw British troops (Kelly-kenny's Division) to the SE on rising
ground and in the scrub by the river bank to the North East were some
of Lt/Col Martyr's mounted infantry exchanging shots with the Boers.
About two and a half miles to the East was the Boer Laager.
Colvile decided to try to get most of the division across the Modder
to close in on Cronje from the NW. To this end, he ordered his
engineers to get a rope across the drift and to break the force of the
stream by running in some wagons (remember the Modder was high).
The second BW had bivouacked close to Paardeberg Drift. According to
the Times History the Highland Brigade had paraded at 4 a. m. and the
2nd Black Watch had finished breakfast shortly before 5. a. m. It was
about then that they heard shots being fired and the Brigade fell in.
At around 6 a. m. Colvile noted that the mounted infantry were in
danger of being driven from their post in the river bed near
Paardeberg Drift. He therefore ordered MacDonald's Highland Brigade
to clear the enemy out of the scrub and thickets which fringed the
left bank above the ford.
Macdonald thought that he could best deal with the counter-attack on
the mounted infantry by moving the Highland Brigade further to the
East before engaging the Boers in the Bush. The Brigade moved in
three parallel columns each in single file with four paces between
each man. Nearest the river marched the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, followed by the 2nd Black Watch. Six companies of
Seaforths formed the second column and the remaining two companies of
that Battalion the third.
Wauchope records that the Battalion advanced at 6 a. m. and marched a
quarter of a mile to the East in single file before being met by heavy
fire. The Brigade turned to the left and the three Battalions became
merged into one long line and responded with independent firing
although the Boers could not be seen.
MacDonald had committed his troops to an attack across two thousand
yards of open and coverless ground against the southern face of the
Boers position. The Brigade was in a formation that lacked depth and
could not therefore possibly succeed. Colvile from this vantage point
watched the attack and his description of it follows.
"It was a very fine feat on the part of the Highlanders and one of
which they will always have reason to be proud. The ground was as bad
as that over which the Guards had advanced at Modder River. I never
hope to see or read of anything grander than the advance of that thin
line across the coverless plain under a hail of lead from their
invisible enemy in the river banks. Thinner and thinner it grew and
thicker and thicker the brown patches on the grass behind it. What
men are able to do the Highlanders did but their seems to be some law
which fixes the exact amount of thinning that a civilised body of men
can stand.
It has nothing to do with fear a Battalion will advance without waiver
under a storm of bullets up to a certain point. On reaching that
point it is possible that the enemy's fire may have slackened but if
the gaps in the ranks are too big it will halt. The critical point of
which I have spoken was reached by Kelly- Kenny's left Battalion at
about 800 yards and into this the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
merged and halted. The Black Watch and Seaforths marched on for
another 300 yards. "
It was only only on the left that the Black watch were able to reach
the river. "A", "B" half of "C" followed by "G" Company arrived at
the near bank about 7 a. m. along with a company of Seaforths. The
river was in spate and said to be unfordable.
However, Capt. C E Stewart of B Company and Piper Donald Cameron
tested it and Stewart called up his widely extended company to the
point where Cameron had found a possible crossing place.
Cameron was the first across followed by the men in groups of ten all
of whom linked arms having hung their ammunition pouches round their
necks.
A Bugler Purdie was nearly swept away but was seized by Sgt. Millar
and saved. The water was up to the mens' waists. Piper Cameron
received the DCM for his gallantry on this occasion. About three
companies of Black Watch made it across along with one Company of
Seaforths. They extended at right angles to the Modder with their
right moving along the river bank but owing to the formation of the
ground the three companies on the left got rather widely separated
from the directing company.
As the four companies moved forward they were met by a sharpish fire
from the deep donga, and to the left front sixty mounted Boers rode
away at a gallop. After advancing six hundred yards along the Bank
and being three hundred and fifty yards from the Donga the movement
was halted as they were now masking the fire of the rest of the
Brigade on the opposite side of the river.
About another company of the Black Watch and some more Seaforths were
brought across by Major Urmston about a mile above Paardeberg Drift
and these now supported the men with Stewart on whose left they were
eventually extended. The Pioneers of the Regiment under Sgt Howden
brought over large supplies of ammunition. He also received the DCM.
As previously described the Black Watch on the southern bank had been
halted by withering Boer fire about four hundred yards from the River
Bank from here they were firing into the double tier of small trenches
near the laager on the right bank and into another row of trenches on
the left bank. So by around 9 a. m. the action here was at a
standstill. However, by mid day E Company had fought its way to the
River Bank, driving the Boers out of their entrenchments and across
the river. It was here that colonel Carthew-Yorstoun, Major Maxwell
and Major Berkeley were wounded.
At about 3 p. m. 19th Brigade made a charge over the open in which all
the Companies of the Highland Brigade on the right bank took part.
Except the extreme right company which was too far in advance to form
a part in the charging line. This charge failed to get home.
Positions were now held until dark. At 7 p. m. an order was received
to retire on the morning's bivouac and carried out by troops on the
left bank. The order did not reach B Company under Capt. Stewart on
the right bank. That company remained on the right of the 19th
Brigade.
At dawn on the 19th this party occupied the Donga which the Boers had
evacuated in the night, but about 10 a. m. they received orders to
cross the river and rejoin the Highland Brigade.
EPILOGUE
On 27th February Cronje surrendered and according to the Official
History 3919 prisoners were taken. Boer Casualties at Paardeberg
between the 17th and 27th February were about 117 killed, 297 wounded.
This site and all contents contained within are copyright (c) Ian Davidson 2000. Reproduction of this site is strictly prohibited without the authors written permission.
